Golden Gate University Law Review
Volume 44 | Issue 2

Article 6

May 2014

The Forgotten Children of the Foster Care System:
Making a Case for the Professional Judgment
Standard
Andrea Koehler
Golden Gate University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Juvenile Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Andrea Koehler, The Forgotten Children of the Foster Care System: Making a Case for the Professional Judgment Standard, 44 Golden Gate
U. L. Rev. 221 (2014).
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss2/6

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at GGU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Golden Gate University Law Review by an authorized administrator of GGU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
jfischer@ggu.edu.

Koehler: Foster Children & the Professional Judgment Standard
KOEHLER_FOSTERKIDS_FORMATTED

5/23/2014 1:41:16 PM

COMMENT
THE FORGOTTEN CHILDREN
OF THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM:
MAKING A CASE FOR THE
PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT
STANDARD
ANDREA KOEHLER 
“They are everybody’s children, and nobody’s children. They are
the forgotten children in the . . . foster care system.” 1
INTRODUCTION
Each year, thousands of children are separated from their families
and placed into foster care. 2 While under the not-so-careful watch of the
state, many suffer further abuse and neglect. 3 In some cases, child


Executive Online Editor, Golden Gate University Law Review, Volume 44; J.D., May
2014, Golden Gate University School of Law.
1
CAROLE KEETON STRAYHORN, FORGOTTEN CHILDREN, at xi (2004), available at
www.hope4kidz.org/pdf/FORGOTTEN_CHILDREN.PDF.
2
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, TRENDS IN FOSTER
CARE
AND
ADOPTION:
FY
2002-FY
2012,
at
1
(2013),
available
at
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/trends_fostercare_adoption2012.pdf.
3
See, e.g.,, NAT’L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, FOSTER CARE VS. FAMILY
PRESERVATION: THE TRACK RECORD ON SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 1-2 (2011), available at
www.nccpr.org/reports/01SAFETY.pdf; Patricia Kilday Hart, Judge Paves Way for Class Action
Lawsuit Over Texas Foster Care System, HOUSTON CHRONICLE (Aug. 29, 2013),
www.houstonchronicle.com/news/columnists/kilday-hart/article/Judge-paves-way-for-class-actionlawsuit-over-4769761.php (Texas); Martine Powers, Lawsuit Faults Mass. on Foster Care System,
THE BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 21, 2013), www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/01/21/class-action-caseagainst-mass-child-welfare-system-start-trial-tuesday/yr6NaoTi6mIuCcNLfHXcyL/story.html
(Massachusetts); Christine Clarridge, DSHS Settles Tacoma Foster Children’s Abuse Case for $11
SEATTLE
TIMES
(Dec.
11,
2012),
Million,
THE
http://seattletimes.com/html/localnews/2019884510_dshs12m.html (Washington); Benjamin Weiser,
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welfare employees are so derelict in their duties that they are unaware
children are being harmed. Thus, maltreatment goes undetected. Despite
egregious failures to protect the children in its care, the state often suffers
no repercussions.
One reason for this travesty is that the “deliberate indifference”
liability standard 4 applied by most courts sets a low bar for the
government’s duty to protect foster children. 5 For example, when a
caseworker repeatedly fails to perform mandated visits, home studies,
and other duties, and, as a result, is unaware that a foster child is being
maltreated, the caseworker’s conduct may not be considered sufficiently
“conscience shocking” 6 for the court to impose liability. 7 On the other
hand, if courts were to adopt the “professional judgment” liability
standard, 8 such a pattern of omissions on the part of a caseworker would
likely result in a finding of liability and allow the foster child to obtain
redress.
The following hypothetical 9 illustrates the unjust implications of
applying the deliberate indifference standard to cases of foster care
maltreatment, rather than applying the more appropriate professional
judgment standard.

City Settles With Disabled People Fraudulently Adopted in ‘90s and Abused, THE NEW YORK TIMES
(Dec. 6, 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/12/07/nyregion/new-york-city-settles-suit-by-abused-fosterchildren.html (New York); Aimee Green, Attorney Files $4.75 Million Lawsuit Against State on
Behalf of 11-Year-Old Boy Whose Lane County Foster Parents Broke His Bones, Burned Him,
LIVE
(June
11,
2012),
www.oregonlive.com/pacific-northwestOREGON
news/index.ssf/2012/06/attorney_files_475_million_law.html (Oregon); Lisa Demer, Sisters
Awarded $2 Million for Years of Abuse in State Care, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (Apr. 21, 2012),
www.adn.com/2012/04/21/2434854/sisters-awarded-2-million-for.html (Alaska).
4
Under the deliberate indifference standard, a state agent may be liable if he or she “knows
of and disregards an excessive risk to [the] health or safety [of someone in state care].” Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). This standard will be further discussed below.
5
Carolyn A. Kubitscheck, Holding Foster Care Agencies Responsible for Abuse and
Neglect,
32
HUMAN
RIGHTS
MAGAZINE
(2005),
available
at
www.americanbar.org/publications/human_rights_magazine_home/human_rights_vol32_2005/winte
r2005/hr_winter05_fostercare.html.
6
As will be discussed below, the Supreme Court held that in order to be liable for a
violation of due process rights, the conduct in question must “‘shock[] the conscience’ and violate[]
the ‘decencies of civilized conduct.’” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998)
(quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-72 (1952)).
7
See, e.g.,, Omar v. Babcock, 177 F.App’x. 59, 64 (11th Cir. 2006).
8
Under the professional judgment standard, a state agent may be liable for actions that are
“a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice, or standards.” Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982). This standard will be further discussed below.
9
This hypothetical is largely based on the heartbreaking story of Demetrius “Omar”
Jurineack. The facts have been modified to illustrate a circumstance in which the verdict could turn
on the liability standard applied. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Omar v. Babcock, 549 U.S. 993
(2006) (No. 06-78); Omar, 177 F.App’x. 59.
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A CASE FOR THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT STANDARD
Cody was only fourteen-months old when his mother abandoned
him and the Department of Children and Families (DCF) took him into
state custody. When Cody was almost three, the DCF placed him with
Marie Wilkes. Ms. Wilkes fostered and subsequently adopted him.
During his time in Wilkes’s household, Cody suffered egregious abuse.
Wilkes beat the young child with a broom handle, hammers, and highheeled shoes; repeatedly whipped him with a belt severely enough to
require hospital treatment; deprived him of food and water for days at a
time; forced him to eat his own feces; tied him to a bedpost; locked him
in a dog cage; and more. Three long years after his placement with
Wilkes, the DCF finally removed Cody from her custody.
The DCF failed to protect Cody from abuse in several ways. First,
the caseworker assigned to Cody failed to perform a child-specific home
study prior to placing Cody in Wilkes’s care. Instead, she relied on a
study for a female teenager completed over a year prior to Cody’s
placement. During that previous study, Wilkes emphasized that she did
not wish to care for a young child. Second, during one of several
hospitalizations prior to his adoption, Cody’s doctor noticed looped
lesions on his body and reported his suspicion of abuse to the DCF. In
addition to this instance, Cody was hospitalized on nine occasions for
dehydration and unexplained seizures. While the DCF did perform a
brief investigation subsequent to the doctor’s report of suspicious
bruising, it failed to explore whether Cody’s repeated bouts of severe
dehydration were the result of maltreatment. Third, DCF records showed
that Cody’s caseworker failed to make numerous mandatory monthly
visits to the Wilkes home. Several of the missed visits occurred during
the months immediately after the doctor’s report of suspected abuse.
Despite these signs and the lack of a child-specific home study, the DCF
allowed Cody to remain in Wilkes’s care and ultimately approved his
adoption by Wilkes.
Years later, Cody pursued an action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 to
vindicate his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment. He alleged that the DCF employees involved with his case
had abdicated their duty to protect him from harm when they placed and
kept him in Wilkes’s abusive home. Cody was unable to procure through
discovery any written evidence that DCF officials were actually aware
that Wilkes was abusing him. However, he did present the expert
testimony of a former DCF official who alleged numerous failures on the
part of the DCF agents responsible for managing his case. The expert
claimed that the DCF employees failed to follow departmental policies,
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including the policy requiring a child-specific home study and the policy
requiring documentation regarding the reasoning for placement.
Additionally, the report noted a failure to make the statutorily required
monthly visits to the Wilkes home. The expert also concluded that the
DCF failed to properly train Wilkes prior to placing Cody in her care and
failed to recognize signs of abuse.
If the presiding court in Cody’s case were to apply the deliberate
indifference standard, Cody would likely have been unsuccessful
because he failed to prove that the DCF workers were deliberately
indifferent to his safety needs. In order to satisfy this standard, “an
official must not only be aware of facts suggesting a substantial risk of
serious harm to the [child], but the official must also draw the inference
that the [child] is likely to be harmed.” 10 Even if the defendants were
aware of facts that could lead to the conclusion that Cody was in danger
of abuse, they would not be held liable if they did not actually draw the
conclusion.
If, on the other hand, the court had applied the professional
judgment standard, Cody would have had a much stronger case. Under
that standard, a government actor may be found liable when his or her
acts or omissions are “such a substantial departure from accepted
professional judgment, practice, or standards as to demonstrate that the
person responsible actually did not base the decision on such a
judgment.” 11 Thus, if the reason the defendants did not actually
conclude Cody was in danger of abuse was because they failed to comply
with statutorily mandated practices and professional standards, they
would most likely be found liable for the harms he suffered.
Despite many requests for the Supreme Court to affirm the
government’s duty to protect foster children and adopt an appropriate
liability standard, the Court has declined to grant certiorari for any such
cases. 12 Part I of this Comment presents a brief look at the children in
foster care and the maltreatment they experience, as well as the federal
and state legislation enacted to provide for their safety. Part II explores §

10

Omar, 177 F.App’x. at 63 (citing Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th Cir. 2004)
(citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
11
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
12
E.g., Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163 (4th Cir. 2010), cert.
denied, 131 S.Ct.392 (2010); Omar, 177 F.App’x. at 59, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 993 (2006); Eugene
D. ex rel. Olivia D. v. Karman, 889 F.2d 701 (6th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 931 (1990); Doe
v. Bobbitt, 881 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990); Taylor ex rel. Walker v.
Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t
of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, Catholic Home Bureau v. Doe, 464 U.S.
864 (1983).
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1983 and Supreme Court precedent establishing the duty to protect
persons from harm caused by private parties, with a focus on the special
relationship doctrine. It also discusses the applicable standards of
liability defined by the Court. Part III reviews and analyzes the various
liability standards used in federal and state actions brought by foster
children for failure to protect them from harm. Part IV assesses the
relevant individual and state interests involved in foster care
maltreatment actions brought under § 1983. This section also compares
and contrasts these interests to the interests of institutionalized mental
health patients and prisoners, as these are the subjects of the Supreme
Courts only holdings regarding the liability standards applicable to
special relationship cases. Further, it assesses the peculiar circumstances
of foster children and the heightened duty that the state has to protect
them from harm. Finally, it proposes that the Supreme Court should
recognize the heightened duty to protect foster children from harm and
adopt the professional judgment standard as the appropriate standard in
foster care maltreatment actions.
I.

FOSTER CHILDREN & THE LAWS INTENDED TO PROTECT THEM

A.

FOSTER CHILDREN’S PECULIAR NEED FOR PROTECTION

Children are removed from their homes and placed into foster care
when the government determines that their parents are unable or
unwilling to take proper care of them. 13 Reasons for removal may
include abuse, neglect, and abandonment. 14 In 2011, over two million
children came into contact with the child welfare system due to reports of
alleged abuse or neglect. 15 Of those children, over 740,000 were
confirmed victims of maltreatment. 16 Roughly 644,000 children spent

13

JAN MCCARTHY ET AL., A FAMILY’S GUIDE TO THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 40-41
(2003), available at www.cwla.org/childwelfare/fg.pdf.
14
Id. (defining abuse to include physical abuse, sexual abuse and emotional abuse).
15
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT
2011, at viii (2012), available at www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm11.pdf (Data submitted
by the States, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. Total is based on the Federal Fiscal Year,
or October 1 through September 30.).
16
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE
OUTCOMES
2008-2011:
REPORT
TO
CONGRESS
5
(2013),
available
at
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cwo08_11.pdf (defining maltreatment as an incident of abuse
or neglect).
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time in the public foster care system, with 398,000 children in foster
care 17 on the last day of the year. 18
The maltreatment that leads these children to be removed from their
parents’ care is just the first level of suffering they experience. 19 The
process of removal then adds an additional layer of trauma the children
must endure. 20 Further, many foster children are subsequently bounced
from foster home to foster home, which often leads to the development
of serious behavioral 21 and emotional attachment problems. 22 Sadly,
once these already vulnerable children are removed from their homes and
placed into state care, many are subjected to further maltreatment in their
foster homes. 23 Throughout their young lives, these children experience
physical and emotional abuse, neglect, abandonment, loss of family
connections, impermanence, and more. 24
As a result of these traumatic experiences, foster children suffer
from an increased risk for mental health disorders, 25 teen pregnancy, 26

17

The federal government defines foster care as “24-hour substitute care for children placed
away from their parents or guardians and for whom the title IV-E agency has placement and care
responsibility. This includes, but is not limited to, placements in foster family homes, foster homes
of relatives, group homes, emergency shelters, residential facilities, child care institutions, and
preadoptive homes.” 45 C.F.R. § 1355.20(a) (Westlaw 2014).
18
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, TRENDS IN FOSTER
CARE
AND
ADOPTION:
FY
2002-FY
2012,
at
1
(2013),
available
at
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/trends_fostercare_adoption2012.pdf.
19
Delilah Bruskas, Children in Foster Care: A Vulnerable Population at Risk, 21 JCAPN 70,
70 (May 2008); see also Sheri Wallace, The Grieving Child in Care, CHILD. VOICE MAG.
(May/June 2003), www.cwla.org/articles/cv0305grieving.htm.
20
See UPenn Collaborative on Cmty. Integration, Removal from the Home: Resulting
Trauma, Temple University Collaborative on Community Inclusion, available at
http://tucollaborative.org/pdfs/Toolkits_Monographs_Guidebooks/parenting/Factsheet_4_Resulting_
Trauma.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2014) (noting the detrimental psychological and neurobiological
effects of disruptions in the parent-child attachment); Wallace, CHILD. VOICE MAG. (explaining that
when the bonds between parent and child are broken by removal, then child must go through a
grieving process).
21
David H. Rubin et al., The Impact of Placement Stability on Behavioral Well-being for
Children in Foster Care, 119 PEDIATRICS 336, 343 (2007).
22
Childhood
Mental
Health:
Attachment,
ADVOKIDS,
http://advokids.org/resources/childhood-mental-health/attachment/ (last visited April 15, 2014).
23
See NAT’L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, FOSTER CARE VS. FAMILY PRESERVATION:
THE TRACK RECORD ON SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 1-2 (2011), available at
www.nccpr.org/reports/01SAFETY.pdf.
24
NINA WILLIAMS-MBENGUE, MOVING CHILDREN OUT OF FOSTER CARE: THE LEGISLATIVE
ROLE IN FINDING PERMANENT HOMES FOR CHILDREN 2 (2008), available at
www.ncsl.org/documents/cyf/movingchildrenoutofcare.pdf.
25
One study found that 47.9% of foster children have “clinically significant emotional and
behavioral problems.” As adults, over 50% of former foster children experience mental illness,
compared to 22% of the control group. Another particularly disturbing study found that 30% of
former foster children have been diagnosed with Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), which was
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homelessness, 27 academic failure, 28 and incarceration. 29 Thus, it is vital
that the state and child welfare agencies do everything they can to keep
these children safe. In furtherance of that obligation, numerous laws,
regulations, and professional standards have been developed to establish
the framework for the state’s protection of its most vulnerable children.
B.

LAWS ENACTED TO SAFETGUARD THE WELL-BEING OF FOSTER
CHILDREN

Federal involvement in child protection began in 1912, when
Congress enacted legislation to establish the Children’s Bureau, a federal
agency dedicated to child welfare issues. 30 Several years later, the Social
Security Act (1935) was enacted, creating the Child Welfare Services
Program. 31 Through this program, the federal government provides
funding to the states for child protective services and foster care

almost twice the rate of PTSD found in veterans who had been in combat. Joann Grayson, Mental
Health Needs of Foster Children and Children at Risk of Removal, CYF NEWS, Winter 2012, at 2-3,
available at www.apa.org/pi/families/resources/newsletter/2012/01/winter.pdf.
26
Approximately 51% of female teens in foster care will become pregnant, compared to 20%
of other female teens. 46% of those females in foster care will have multiple pregnancies before the
age of 19. Heather D. Boonstra, Teen Pregnancy Among Young Women in Foster Care: A Primer,
POL’Y
REV.
8,
9
(2011),
available
at
14
GUTTMACHER
www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/14/2/gpr140208.pdf.
27
National studies indicate a homelessness rate of between 12-30% of former foster children
who aged out of the system.
Facts About Aging Out, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS,
www.childrensrights.org/issues-resources/foster-care/facts-about-aging-out/ (last visited April 15,
2014); A study of former foster children in the Midwestern U.S. found that by the age of 26, 36%
had been homeless at some point in their lives. Predictors of Homelessness During Transition from
Foster Care to Adulthood, CHAPIN HALL AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO,
www.chapinhall.org/research/inside/predictors-homelessness-during-transition-foster-care-adulthood
(last visited April 15, 2014).
28
Foster children are 2.5-3.5 times as likely to receive special education than other children,
3 times more likely to be expelled, and 2 times as likely to be absent. NAT’L WORKING GRP. ON
FOSTER CARE & EDUC., FOSTERING SUCCESS IN EDUCATION: NATIONAL FACTSHEET ON THE
EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES OF CHILDREN IN FOSTER CARE 1 (2014), available at
www.fostercareandeducation.org/DesktopModules/Bring2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?EntryId=127
9&Command=Core_Download&method=inline&PortalId=0&TabId=124.
29
WILLIAMS-MBENGUE, MOVING CHILDREN OUT OF FOSTER CARE 2; see also Facts About
Aging Out, CHILDREN’S RIGHTS (reporting that national studies indicate that, of foster children who
aged out of the system, between 18-26% were incarcerated).
30
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE STORY OF THE
CHILDREN’S
BUREAU
4
(2012),
available
at
http://cb100.acf.hhs.gov/sites/all/themes/danland/danblog/files/Story_of_CB.pdf.
31
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION CONCERNED WITH
CHILD PROTECTION, CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION 2 n.1 (2012), available at
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/majorfedlegis.pdf.
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services. 32 In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and
CAPTA provides funding for child
Treatment Act (CAPTA). 33
maltreatment-related research, training, and program development. 34 It
also established child maltreatment reporting requirements and
established the National Center on Child Abuse and Neglect (now the
Office on Child Abuse and Neglect). 35 Other significant federal laws
enacted for the benefit of foster children 36 include the Adoption and Safe
Families Act of 1997, 37 the Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, 38 and
the Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of
2008. 39
Today, the Children’s Bureau works with state, tribal, federal, and
local agencies to promote the safety and well-being of children through
the development of programs to prevent child maltreatment. 40 A crucial
responsibility of the Bureau is to monitor state foster care systems. 41 In
accord with Social Security Act requirements, the Children’s Bureau
tracks data regarding the maltreatment of children in foster care, with the

32

Id.
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, ABOUT CAPTA: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1 (2011),
available at www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/about.pdf. See generally Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5101-5119c (Westlaw 2014) (provides funding in support of
investigation, prevention, and identification of abuse and neglect of children).
34
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, THE STORY OF THE
CHILDREN’S BUREAU 15.
35
Id.
36
See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
CONCERNED WITH CHILD PROTECTION, CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION 3.
37
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (codified in
scattered
sections
of
42
U.S.C.),
available
at
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW105publ89/html/PLAW-105publ89.htm (providing for improved permanency planning for children
in foster care).
38
Foster Care Independence Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-169, 113 Stat. 1822 (codified in
scattered
sections
of
42
U.S.C.),
available
at
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW106publ169/pdf/PLAW-106publ169.pdf (providing states with additional funding to implement
programs to aid foster children with the transition from state care to independence).
39
Fostering Connections to Success and Increasing Adoptions Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110351, 122 Stat. 3949 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), available at
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-110publ351/html/PLAW-110publ351.htm (providing for increased
support for relative caregivers, improved outcomes for foster children, tribal access to foster care and
adoption, and adoption incentives ).
40
U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT
2012, at 1 (2013), available at www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2012.pdf.
41
The Bureau monitors foster care systems through Adoption and Foster Care Analysis and
Reporting System assessment reviews, Child and Family Services Reviews, Statewide Automated
Child Welfare Information System assessment reviews, and Title IV-E foster care eligibility reviews.
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Children’s Bureau, Monitoring, ACF: CHILDREN’S BUREAU,
www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/monitoring (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
33
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ultimate goal of reducing the incidence of abuse and neglect. 42 Another
important function of the Children’s Bureau is to administer a number of
funding programs to support state foster care programs and child
protective programs. 43
For a state to receive federal funding for its foster care programs,
the state must establish and maintain basic licensing standards that
correspond with the recommendations of certain national organizations, 44
including standards related to safety and the protection of civil rights.45
The intent of these licensing requirements is to reduce the risk of harm to
foster children and to ensure that they are provided with a “safe, stable,
nurturing environment.” 46 One licensing requirement of vital importance
is that each member of a foster household must pass a background check
showing no record of child abuse or neglect and no convictions for
certain crimes. 47 Additionally, licensing requirements generally include
a minimum age, a minimum income, and adequate physical and mental
health. 48 Most states also require that prospective foster parents
complete a training course prior to becoming licensed, 49 and some states
require regular maintenance training after licensure. 50 Finally, most

42

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT
2012, at 90.
43
See CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
CONCERNED WITH CHILD PROTECTION, CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION 2 (2012), available at
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/majorfedlegis.pdf (including title IV-B Child Welfare
Services and Promoting Safe and Stable Families programs, the title IV-E Foster Care Program, the
title IV-E Adoption Assistance Program, and the title IV-E Chafee Foster Care Independence
Program); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD
MALTREATMENT 2012, at 1.
44
One such organization is the Child Welfare League of America. See Children’s Welfare
League of Am., History: The Role of CWLA in Standards Development, CWLA,
www.cwla.org/programs/standards/history.htm (last visited Jan. 19, 2014).
45
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 671(a)(10) (Westlaw 2014).
46
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, HOME STUDY REQUIREMENTS FOR PROSPECTIVE
FOSTER
PARENTS
1
(2011),
available
at
www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/homestudyreqs.pdf.
47
Disqualifying crimes under federal law include felony child abuse or neglect, spousal
abuse, a crime against children (including child pornography), a crime involving violence (including
rape, sexual assault, or homicide), and if within the prior five years, felony assault, felony battery, or
a felony drug offense. Moreover, disqualifying crimes under state laws may include any other crime
of violence, arson, kidnapping, illegal use of weapons or explosives, fraud, forgery, burglary, and
robbery. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS FOR PROSPECTIVE
FOSTER
AND
ADOPTIVE
PARENTS
1-2
(2011),
available
at
www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/background.pdf.
48
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, HOME STUDY REQUIREMENTS FOR PROSPECTIVE
FOSTER PARENTS 2.
49
Id. at 3.
50
See id. at 11 passim.
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states require a home study to evaluate whether the household is suitable
for providing a safe home for foster children. 51
In addition to licensing and home study requirements, most states
have created standards for caseworker performance in order to prevent
maltreatment and improve outcomes for children. 52 For example, fortythree states require that caseworkers visit with foster children at least
once a month, to regularly assess the children’s well-being. 53 Many
states have also adopted quality standards for caseworker visits,
addressing such issues as safety needs and communication. 54 As the
frequency and quality of caseworker visits increase, so do positive
outcomes for foster children. 55 When caseworkers maintain regular
contact and open lines of communication with foster children, they are in
a better position to evaluate their needs and to discover maltreatment. 56
Despite these protective measures, foster children across the nation
continue to be abused and neglected while in state care. 57 When the
child welfare system fails them, many foster children turn to litigation.
II.

WHEN THE STATE FAILS TO PROTECT: 42 U.S.C.A. SECTION 1983
& THE STATE’S DUTY UNDER THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
DOCTRINE

Where the state has failed to protect a foster child from abuse and
neglect, the child may pursue legal action against the child welfare
agencies, officials, and employees responsible for their care. Aggrieved
51

Id. at 5.
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKER VISITS
WITH
CHILDREN
AND
PARENTS
3
(2006),
available
at
www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/cyf/caseworkervisits.pdf.
53
Id.; But see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD
WELFARE OUTCOMES 2008-2011: REPORT TO CONGRESS 19 (2013), available at
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cwo08_11.pdf (reporting that only approximately 82%
received monthly visits in 2011).
54
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKER VISITS
WITH CHILDREN AND PARENTS 4.
55
Id. at 1; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL,
STATE STANDARDS AND PRACTICES FOR CONTENT OF CASEWORKER VISITS WITH CHILDREN IN
FOSTER CARE 1 (2005), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-03-00351.pdf (reporting
that findings of Child and Family Service Reviews (CFSRs) show a correlation between a positive
rating on caseworker visits and positive ratings on other areas under review, including permanency
and child safety).
56
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKER VISITS
WITH CHILDREN AND PARENTS 5.
57
See NAT’L COAL. FOR CHILD PROT. REFORM, FOSTER CARE VS. FAMILY PRESERVATION:
THE TRACK RECORD ON SAFETY AND WELL-BEING 1-2 (2011), available at
www.nccpr.org/reports/01SAFETY.pdf.
52

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss2/6

10

Koehler: Foster Children & the Professional Judgment Standard
KOEHLER_FOSTERKIDS_FORMATTED

5/23/2014 1:41:16 PM

2014] Foster Children & the Professional Judgment Standard

231

children may bring a suit under state tort laws. 58 They may also bring §
1983 actions against the state for violations of rights granted by some of
the aforementioned federal laws. 59 Finally, they may bring § 1983
actions for violations of their substantive due process rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 60
To determine what must be proven in a § 1983 action against the
state for violations of a foster child’s rights under the Fourteenth
Amendment, one must look to both the statute and to a line of Supreme
Court cases regarding the government’s duty to protect. In DeShaney v.
Winnebago County, the Court described exceptions to the general rule
that the state has no affirmative duty to protect people from harm caused
by private parties. 61 One of the exceptions is the “special relationship
doctrine,” which lower courts have applied to the relationship between
the state and foster children in its care. 62 While the Supreme Court has
yet to hear a special relationship action brought by a foster child, lower
courts have assessed the rights of foster children and determined the
applicable liability standards under § 1983 by looking to Supreme Court
cases that have defined the state’s duty to protect in other contexts.
A.

RIGHT TO REDRESS UNDER §1983 FOR VIOLATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

When deprived of a right granted by the Constitution or federal law,
an aggrieved party may bring a private action against the responsible
government agents under § 1983. 63 Enacted as part of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, § 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights,” but a

58

See Eric M. Larsson & Jean A. Talbot, Cause of Action for Negligent Placement in or
Supervision of Foster Home, 43 COA2D 1 § 5 (Dec. 2013). Beyond this reference, this Comment
will not discuss state tort actions.
59
See id. at § 10. Beyond this reference, this Comment will not discuss § 1983 actions for
violations of rights granted by federal laws.
60
See id.
61
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
62
See, e.g., Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 842 (9th Cir. 2010);
Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 880
(5th Cir. 2004); Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc).
63
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Westlaw 2014) (stating in pertinent part: “Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District
of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”).
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means for asserting other federal rights. 64 To establish an action under §
1983, the plaintiff must prove that the harmful action occurred “under
color of state law” 65 and that it caused a deprivation of a constitutional
right or a federal statutory right. 66 While not expressly stated in § 1983,
the plaintiff must also show that the government actor possessed the
requisite state of mind to be held liable for the underlying violation. 67
The applicable state-of-mind requirement, or liability standard, depends
on the constitutional or statutory right that has been deprived. 68
When the state has failed to protect a foster child from
maltreatment, the rights implicated are those substantive due process
rights granted by the Fourteenth Amendment. 69 Specifically, the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the liberty interest in a safe environment
and the interest in being free from unreasonable risks of harm. 70 As the
Eleventh Circuit has explained:
[T]he child’s physical safety was a primary objective in placing the
child in the foster home. The state’s action in assuming the
responsibility of finding and keeping the child in a safe environment
place[s] an obligation on the state to insure the continuing safety of
that environment. The state’s failure to meet that obligation, as
evidenced by the child’s injuries, in the absence of overriding societal
interests, constitute[s] a deprivation of liberty under the fourteenth
amendment. 71

64

Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137,
144 n.3 (1979)).
65
Requires that the defendant “exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” West v. Atkins, 487
U.S. 42, 49 (1998) (quoting U.S. v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
66
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
67
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 405 (1997).
68
Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330 (1986) (citing the following examples: Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (invidious discriminatory purpose
required for claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause) and Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97 (1976) (“deliberate indifference” to prisoner’s serious illness or injury sufficient to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment)).
69
See, e.g., Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 844 (9th Cir. 2010);
Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t
of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 893 (10th Cir. 1992); Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d
791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987).
70
Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777 (1997)
(bodily integrity as a liberty interest); Daniels, 474 U.S. at 341 (freedom from bodily injury as a
liberty interest).
71
Taylor, 818 F.2d 791 at 795.
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That being said, while an act perpetrated by a government agent that
directly harms a person would be considered an unconstitutional
deprivation of liberty, a failure to actively prevent harm caused by
private parties does not generally subject the state to liability. 72 So,
when a foster child has been maltreated by his or her foster parent, the
child must rely on one of the exceptions to the “no-duty rule” 73 the
Supreme Court set forth in DeShaney v. Winnebago County.
B.

STATE’S LIMITED DUTY TO PROTECT AGAINST HARM CAUSED BY
PRIVATE PARTIES

In DeShaney, the Supreme Court affirmed the general principle that
the state has no constitutional duty to protect people from harm caused
by private parties, explaining that “nothing in the language of the Due
Process Clause itself requires the State to protect the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.” 74 The minor
plaintiff, Joshua DeShaney, sued child welfare agents under § 1983 for
failing to protect him from the abuse of his father, alleging that the
failure was a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process rights. 75 Joshua’s caseworkers had been repeatedly alerted to
suspicions that his father was abusing him, but chose not to remove
Joshua from his father’s care. 76 Approximately two years after the first
allegations of abuse were reported, Joshua’s father beat him into a coma,
leaving him with permanent injuries so severe that Joshua would spend
the remainder of his life in an institution. 77 The Court found that, as the
state had no constitutional duty to protect Joshua from his father, the
failure to protect him did not constitute a violation of his due process
rights. 78 Thus, the child welfare agents could not be held liable under §
1983. 79
The Court noted in its decision, however, that certain circumstances
exist where the Constitution may impose a duty upon government actors

72

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
See Laura Oren, DeShaney and “State-Created Danger”: Does the Exception Make the
“No-Duty” Rule?, 35-SUM ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 3, 3-4 (2010).
74
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
75
Id. at 194-95.
76
Id. at 192-93.
77
Id. at 193.
78
Id. at 202.
79
Id.
73
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to affirmatively protect persons from harm. 80 Two exceptions to the
DeShaney no-duty rule have been recognized (1) where the state has
created the danger 81 or (2) where there exists a special relationship
between the harmed party and the state. 82 If one of these exceptions
applies, and the state therefore has an affirmative duty to protect
someone, the responsible government agents may be held liable for their
actions and for the failure to act when necessary. 83
The “special relationship doctrine” applies when the state has taken
a person into custody “against his [or her] will,” effectively restraining
the person’s “freedom to act on his [or her] own behalf.” 84 In that
instance, the state must then assume the duty to provide for the person’s
basic needs, including the need for safety. 85 Where the government fails
to provide for these needs, it can be held liable in a § 1983 action for the
violation of the individual’s rights under the Fourteenth Amendment or
the Eighth Amendment. 86
At the time DeShaney was decided, the Supreme Court had already
decided that the state had affirmative duties to protect prisoners 87 and
involuntarily committed mental patients, and they could, therefore, bring
§ 1983 actions against government actors for failures to protect them
from harm. 88 Although the Court also noted that a similar action might
lie when a child has been removed from his home and placed into foster
care, it did not conclusively decide the issue. 89 While a few courts had
recognized the duty to protect foster children from harm prior to

80

Id. at 198 (summarizing the protections afforded in Estelle v. Gamble and Youngberg v.

Romeo).
81

Id. at 201; see also Schnurr v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 189 F.Supp.2d 1105, 1122-1123 (D.
Colo. 2001). Beyond this mention, the state created danger exception is outside the scope of this
Comment.
82
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200; see also Schnurr, 189 F.Supp.2d at 1122-1123.
83
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 198.
84
Id. at 200.
85
Id. at 199-200 (“e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety”).
86
Id. at 198.
87
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976).
88
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 (1982).
89
DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201 n.9.
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DeShaney, 90 the duty has subsequently been found to exist by most state
and federal courts. 91
Since the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the duty to protect
foster children, lower courts have developed their standards by looking
to the following string of Supreme Court cases that address the state’s
duty to protect people from harm.
C.

STANDARDS OF LIABILITY IN DUTY TO PROTECT CASES

In two seminal cases, the Supreme Court addressed the state’s duty
to protect under the special relationship doctrine, establishing different
liability standards in each instance. 92 In Estelle v. Gamble, the Supreme
Court held that the liability standard in prison maltreatment cases is
deliberate indifference, 93 and in Youngberg v. Romeo, the Court held that
the standard in mental institution maltreatment cases is the professional
judgment standard. 94 Since then, the Court has refined and clarified

90

See, e.g., Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987) (“[A]
child involuntarily placed in a foster home is in a situation so analogous to a prisoner in a penal
institution and a child confined in a mental health facility that the foster child may bring a section
1983 action.”); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1981) (recognizing
that a child in state custody has a constitutional right not to be placed in a foster care setting known
to be unsafe).
91
See, e.g., Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“[W]hen the state
places a child in state-regulated foster care, the state has entered into a special relationship with that
child which imposes upon it certain affirmative duties. The failure to perform such duties can give
rise, under sufficiently culpable circumstances, to liability under section 1983.”); Norfleet v. Ark.
Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 293 (8th Cir. 1993) (“[I]t was clearly established . . . that the
state had an obligation to provide adequate medical care, protection and supervision [to foster
children].”); Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 892-93 (10th
Cir. 1992) (Children have a “clearly established right to protection while in foster care.”); Meador v.
Cabinet for Human Resources, 902 F.2d 474, 476 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[D]ue process extends the right
to be free from the infliction of unnecessary harm to children in state-regulated foster homes.”); K.H.
ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Youngberg made the basic duty of
the state to children in state custody clear, and . . . the duty [can] not be avoided by substituting
private for public custodians.”); J.R. v. Gloria, 599 F.Supp.2d 182, 194-95 (D.R.I. 2009)
(recognizing an “affirmative duty to ensure the safety and well-being” of foster children); Braam ex
rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 856 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (recognizing “foster children possess
substantive due process rights” to protection from harm); Kara B. v. Dane Cnty., 555 N.W.2d 630,
637 (Wisc. 1996) (Foster children have a “clearly established constitutional right under the Due
Process Clause to safe and secure placement in a foster home”). But see White ex rel. v. Chambliss,
112 F.3d 731, 738 (4th Cir. 1997) (“[W]e cannot say that a right to affirmative state protection for
children placed in foster care was clearly established.”).
92
Youngberg, 457 U.S. 307; Estelle, 429 U.S. 97.
93
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
94
Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 323.
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these standards multiple times. Particularly significant were its holdings
in Farmer v. Brennan 95 and County of Sacramento v. Lewis. 96
In Estelle, the Supreme Court established the liability standard
under the Eighth Amendment for harm suffered by prisoners while in
government care. 97 The plaintiff was a prisoner who brought a § 1983
action against the state, claiming that inadequate medical care resulted in
a violation of his Eight Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. 98 The Court applied the deliberate indifference
standard, under which state actors may be liable only if they are
deliberately indifferent to the basic needs of the plaintiffs. 99 In
describing what action was illustrative of deliberate indifference, the
Court cited various examples of intentional acts by government
employees. 100
Several years later, the Supreme Court asserted that deliberate
indifference was akin to criminal recklessness, explaining that “acting or
failing to act with deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious
harm to a prisoner is the equivalent of recklessly disregarding that
risk.” 101 In Farmer v. Brennan, the Court held that, in actions brought
by prisoners alleging inhumane conditions, the plaintiff must show that
the responsible prison official was aware of facts “from which the
inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed,
and he must also draw the inference.” 102 Thus, as used in the Eighth
Amendment context, deliberate indifference requires that the government
agent subjectively knew of the risk of harm to the plaintiff. 103
In Youngberg, the Supreme Court set forth the liability standard
applicable when an involuntarily institutionalized mental health patient
has been harmed while in state care. 104 The plaintiff, a man who was
substantially mentally disabled, had allegedly been injured over sixty
times during the first two and a half years he spent in a state mental

95

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
97
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
98
Id. at 101.
99
Id. at 104.
100
Id. at 104-05, 104 n.10 (noting examples of intentional conduct, including the “injection of
penicillin with knowledge that prisoner was allergic,” “refusal of paramedic to provide treatment,”
and “prison physician refuses to administer the prescribed pain killer and renders leg surgery
unsuccessful by requiring prisoner to stand despite contrary instructions of surgeon”).
101
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 836 (1994).
102
Id. at 837.
103
Id. at 838.
104
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-23 (1982).
96

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss2/6

16

Koehler: Foster Children & the Professional Judgment Standard
KOEHLER_FOSTERKIDS_FORMATTED

5/23/2014 1:41:16 PM

2014] Foster Children & the Professional Judgment Standard

237

institution. 105 The Court determined that mental health patients were
“entitled to more considerate treatment and conditions” than prisoners. 106
In finding there should be a higher standard of care, the Court held that
the interests of the state must be balanced against the rights of the
individual. 107 Under the professional judgment standard, a government
actor is liable when his or her actions are “such a substantial departure
from accepted professional 108 judgment, practice, or standards as to
demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the decision
on such a judgment.” 109
Subsequently, the Supreme Court clarified that in order for a state
agent to be held liable, the challenged action must “shock[] the
conscience.” 110 In County of Sacramento v. Lewis, the Court explained
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive due process provision
protects against “arbitrary action,” and that to be sufficiently arbitrary,
the challenged conduct must shock the conscience in violation of the
“decencies of civilized conduct.” 111 Negligently inflicted harm may
never be sufficiently shocking to be considered a constitutional
violation. 112 Conversely, intentionally injurious conduct is highly likely
to shock the conscience. 113 Where the government actor’s state of mind
falls in between those two poles, liability depends on “an exact analysis
of the circumstances” involved. 114
The Supreme Court has yet to rule on the state of mind required to
establish liability in § 1983 actions brought by foster children, creating a
split among federal and state courts as to which liability standard to
Many courts require that the plaintiff prove that the
apply. 115
105

Id. at 310.
Id. at 321-22.
107
Id. at 321.
108
The Court defined a “professional” as “a person competent, whether by education, training
or experience, to make the particular decision at issue.” Id. at 323 n.30.
109
Id. at 323.
110
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998) (noting shocks-the-conscience
test first applied in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)).
111
Id. at 845-46.
112
Id. at 849; see also Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
113
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 854 (explaining, for example, that when a police officer
has engaged in a high-speed chase, his or her conduct may only be considered conscious shocking if
the officer “inten[ded] to harm [the] suspect[] physically or to worsen their legal plight.”).
114
Id. at 850.
115
See, e.g., Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 844 (9th Cir. 2010)
(deliberate indifference standard); Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective &
Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 881 (5th Cir. 2004) (deliberate indifference); Yvonne L. ex rel.
Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th Cir. 1992) (professional judgment
standard); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 141 (2d Cir. 1981) (deliberate
106
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government was deliberately indifferent, 116 others apply the professional
judgment standard, 117 some require subjective knowledge of harm, 118
some apply an objective standard, 119 and some apply a “shocks-theconscience” analysis, 120 while others do not. 121 So, decades after the
first court recognized the right of a foster child to bring a § 1983
action, 122 there remains no clear liability standard.
III. COURTS SPLIT OVER DUTY TO PROTECT & APPLICABLE LIABILITY
STANDARD IN FOSTER CARE MALTREATMENT CASES
Without the direction of a Supreme Court holding, courts presiding
over foster care maltreatment cases have adopted myriad variations of
the deliberate indifference and professional judgment standards. In
defining the applicable liability standard, a court delineates the bounds of
the state’s duty to protect, which consequently affects foster children’s
constitutionally protected liberty interests. Unfortunately, courts have
often decided which standard to use, not by assessing the interests of the
maltreated foster children before them, but rather by looking to other
courts, mechanically applying the standard presented by the parties, or
making inapt comparisons between prisoners and foster children.
A.

DELIBERATE INDIFFERANCE STANDARD IN FOSTER CARE CASES

In foster care abuse cases, a significant number of courts have
chosen to adopt the deliberate indifference standard originally set forth in
the prisoner’s rights action, Estelle v. Gamble, 123 a standard many

indifference); T.M. ex rel. R.T. v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1187 (D. Wyo. 2000) (professional
judgment); Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 858 (Wash. 2003) (en banc) (professional
judgment standard).
116
See, e.g., Tamas, 630 F.3d at 844; Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 881; Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d
798, 808 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); Norfleet v. Ark. Dep’t of Human Servs., 989 F.2d 289, 291-292
(8th Cir. 1993); Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d at 141.
117
See, e.g., Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 894; T.M. ex rel. R.T., 93 F. Supp. 2d at 1187 (D. Wyo.
2000); Braam, 81 P.3d at 858.
118
See, e.g., Tamas, 630 F.3d at 845; Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 881; J.R. v. Gloria, 599
F.Supp.2d 182, 196 (D.R.I. 2009).
119
See, e.g., Nicini, 212 F.3d at 811-12; Kara B. v. Dane Cnty., 542 N.W.2d 777, 787 (Wisc.
Ct. App. 1996).
120
See, e.g., Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 880; Nicini, 212 F.3d at 810; Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v.
Patrick, 771 F.Supp.2d 142, 163 (D.Mass. 2011).
121
See, e.g., Henry A. v. Willden, 678 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2012); Phelan ex rel. Phelan v.
Torres, 843 F.Supp.2d 259 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
122
See Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d 134, 145 (2d Cir. 1981).
123
Nicini, 212 F.3d at 810.
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consider the “minimum standard of care required to meet the State’s
substantive due process duties . . . .” 124 Some courts have further refined
the deliberate indifference test in accord with the holding in another
prisoners’ rights case, Farmer v. Brennan, that subjective knowledge is
required. 125 After the Farmer decision, courts have required less and
less of child welfare agents. However, in its infancy, the deliberate
indifference standard as applied to foster care maltreatment lawsuits
allowed for greater consideration of caseworkers’ failure to comply with
their professional duties.
One of the first courts to recognize the right of foster children to
bring a § 1983 action for maltreatment was the Second Circuit. In Doe v.
New York City Department of Social Services, a case decided before
Youngberg, the court applied the Estelle standard. 126 In order to be
found liable, the court held that a defendant must be “deliberate[ly]
indifferen[t] to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty[.]” 127
The court also explained that the standard was “closely associated” with
gross negligence, 128 in that “gross negligent conduct creates a strong
presumption of deliberate indifference.” 129 One of the plaintiff’s
allegations was that the defendants failed to perform certain statutory
duties designed to protect children from maltreatment, including the duty
to report suspected abuse. 130 The court held that, while there may be no
strict liability for failure to perform such duties, evidence of the failure to
report was relevant to the issue of deliberate indifference. 131 In doing so,
the court affirmed its prior holdings that deliberate indifference could be
inferred from a “pattern of omissions.” 132

124

Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 858 (Wash. 2003) (en banc); see also Doe v.
N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 790 (2d Cir. 1983) (concluding the deliberate
indifferences standard is “stricter” than the professional judgment standard); Wendy H. v. City of
Philadelphia, 849 F.Supp. 367, 371-72 (E.D.Pa. 1994) (noting the deliberate indifference standard is
“more permissive” than the professional judgment standard).
125
See, e.g., Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 845 (9th Cir. 2010);
Hernandez, 380 F.3d at 881; J.R. v. Gloria, 599 F.Supp.2d 182, 196 (D.R.I. 2009).
126
Doe v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d at 141.
127
Id. at 145 (emphasis added).
128
The court noted that “Traditionally the term ‘gross negligence’ has been held equivalent to
the words ‘reckless and wanton,’. . . and the Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gamble. . . has
characterized deliberate indifference as ‘the wanton infliction of unnecessary pain.’” Doe v. N.Y.C.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 649 F.2d at 143 n.4.
129
Id. at 143.
130
Id. at 140.
131
Id. at 146-47.
132
Id. at 145.
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After Doe v. N.Y.C., other courts began to acknowledge the right of
foster children to be free from maltreatment while in state care. 133 One
such court was the Eleventh Circuit, which initially modeled its liability
standard after the standard applied by the court in Doe. 134 The court
chose to use the deliberate indifference standard even though they noted
that the liberty interest was similar to the liberty interest in Youngberg. 135
Subsequent to making this comparison between foster children and
mental health patients, the court proceeded to look to the Second
Circuit’s analysis of the similarities between foster children and prison
inmates, 136 abandoning further consideration of Youngberg.
In addition to looking to other circuits, many courts that have
applied the deliberate indifference standard have done so solely because
it was the standard presented by the parties. 137 For example, in choosing
to use the deliberate indifference standard, 138 the Third Circuit did not
consider the professional judgment standard of Youngberg. 139 The court
also did not assess whether to apply the objective “should have known”
test or the subjective “actually knew” test asserted in Farmer, adopting
the plaintiff’s objective analysis without question. 140 Instead, the court
focused heavily on whether the defendant’s conduct was conscience
shocking. 141 The court also declined to address whether a failure to act
on the part of a state agent could ever constitute deliberate
indifference. 142
The Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, did apply the deliberate
indifference standard set forth in Farmer, which includes both a
subjective and an objective element. 143 The court held that for deliberate
133

See, e.g., Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir. 1987);
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 303 (7th Cir. 1987); Gibson v.
Merced Cnty. Dep’t of Human Res., 799 F. 2d 582, 589 (9th Cir. 1986).
134
Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795-96 (“Defendants may be liable. . . if they. . . exhibited deliberate
indifference to a known injury, a known risk, or a specific duty. . .”). The Eleventh Circuit
subsequently adopted the deliberate indifference standard used in Farmer, requiring subjective
knowledge that the child was at substantial risk of harm. Ray v. Foltz, 370 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th
Cir. 2004).
135
Taylor, 818 F.2d at 795.
136
Id. at 796.
137
See, e.g., Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 811 n.9 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); Gibson, 799 F.
2d at 589-90; Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 859 (Wash. 2003) (en banc).
138
Nicini, 212 F.3d at 811.
139
Id. at 811 n.9.
140
Id. at 811-12.
141
Id.
142
Id. at 812.
143
Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 380 F.3d
872, 881 (5th Cir. 2004).
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indifference to be established, the state actor “must be both aware of
facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” 144 The court
also stressed that the subjective element may be inferred “from the fact
that the risk of harm is obvious.” 145 Clarifying that it did not intend to
weaken the standard, the court further explained that deliberate
indifference was a higher standard than gross negligence. 146
Again relying on the liability standard used by sister courts, the
Ninth Circuit adopted the deliberate indifference standard with no
consideration of the professional judgment standard. 147 The court opted
to interpret the standard to require both an objective and a subjective
element, 148 and to require that the state agent’s behavior “shocks the
conscience.” 149 Like the Fifth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit also decided that
the subjective element may be inferred where the risk of harm was
obvious, 150 such that “a reasonable official would have been compelled
to draw that inference.” 151 In so defining the deliberate indifference
standard, the court injected objectivity into the supposedly subjective
element of the standard.
Overall, in defining the duty to protect foster children and
determining which liability standard to adopt, most circuit courts have
failed to carefully consider the peculiar circumstances of foster children.
Unfortunately, neither have many of the courts that have adopted the
professional judgment standard.
B.

PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT STANDARD IN FOSTER CARE CASES

While most courts have applied the deliberate indifference standard,
a few courts have opted to use modified versions of the professional
judgment standard set forth in Youngberg. 152 Additionally, while the

144

Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)).
Id. (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 738 (2002)).
146
Id. at 882.
147
Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 844 (9th Cir. 2010).
148
Id. at 845.
149
Id. at 844 (“deliberate indifference to a known or so obvious as to imply knowledge of,
danger.” (quoting Kennedy v. City of Ridgefield, 439 F.3d 1055, 1064 (9th Cir. 2006))).
150
Id. at 845 (citing Hernandez ex rel. Hernandez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory
Servs., 380 F.3d 872, 881 (5th Cir. 2004)).
151
Id.
152
See, e.g., Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894
(10th Cir. 1992); Connor B. ex rel. Vigurs v. Patrick, 771 F.Supp.2d 142, 163 (D.Mass. 2011); T.M.
ex rel. R.T. v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179 (D. Wyo. 2000); Charlie H. v. Whitman, 83 F.Supp.2d
476, 507 (D.N.J., 2000); Jordan v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F.Supp.2d 638, 646 (E.D.Pa. 1999);
145
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Supreme Court and numerous other courts have asserted that a difference
exists between the deliberate indifference and professional judgment
standards, 153 a few courts have concluded that there is virtually no
difference between the two standards. 154
The Seventh Circuit, for example, initially 155 elected to apply a
version of the professional judgment standard that was essentially
equivalent to the deliberate indifference standard. 156 The court held that
the professional judgment standard did not “impose . . . [a] duty of
inquiry in these cases.” 157 So, liability could only attach where the
defendants knew of or suspected that the child was being maltreated. 158
Only then could the state actor’s behavior shock the conscience. In an
earlier case, the Seventh Circuit also made clear that government agents
could only be held liable for placing a foster child with a person or
people “they know to be dangerous or otherwise unfit.” 159 The dissent in
that case noted that the standard applied by the Seventh Circuit was more
stringent than that set forth in Youngberg. 160
Upon consideration of the standard set forth by the Seventh Circuit,
the Tenth Circuit noted that it “doubt[ed] there is much difference”
between that standard and the deliberate indifference standard, as applied
in the foster care context. 161 Nonetheless, the court elected to apply the

LaShawn A. v. Dixon, 762 F.Supp. 959, 996 (D.D.C. 1991); Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d
851, 858 (Wash. 2003) (en banc); Kara B. ex rel. Albert v. Dane Cnty., 555 N.W.2d 630, 637 (Wis.
1996).
153
See, e.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982); Terrence v. Northville Reg’l
Psychiatric Hosp., 286 F.3d 834, 848 (6th Cir. 2002) (noting that Youngberg provides “heightened
constitutional protection” over deliberate indifference standard.); Patten v. Nichols, 274 F.3d 829,
843 (4th Cir. 2001) (“Applying the deliberate indifference standard. . . would be giving involuntarily
committed patients the same treatment as that afforded to convicted prisoners, a result the
Youngberg Court specifically condemned.”); Kulak v. City of New York, 88 F.3d 63, 75 (2d Cir.
1996) (concluding the professional judgment standard requires less than deliberate indifference);
Shaw ex rel. Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135, 1150 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he plaintiff carries a
greater burden when trying to show deliberate indifference than when trying to establish a failure to
exercise professional judgment.”).
154
See Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 894; Weatherford ex rel. Michael L. v. State, 81 P.3d 320, 329.
155
After Lewis v. Anderson and K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, the Seventh Circuit described
the standard as a “modified deliberate indifference standard,” rejecting the professional judgment
standard set forth in Youngberg. J.H. ex rel. Higgin v. Johnson, 346 F.3d 788, 792 (7th Cir. 2003).
156
Mark Strasser, Deliberate Indifference, Professional Judgment, and the Constitution: On
Liberty Interests in the Child Placement Context, 15 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223, 231 (2008).
157
Lewis v. Anderson, 308 F.3d 768, 773 (7th Cir. 2002).
158
Id.
159
K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 854 (7th Cir. 1990).
160
Id. at 862 (Coffey, J., dissenting).
161
Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v. N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th Cir.
1992).

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol44/iss2/6

22

Koehler: Foster Children & the Professional Judgment Standard
KOEHLER_FOSTERKIDS_FORMATTED

5/23/2014 1:41:16 PM

2014] Foster Children & the Professional Judgment Standard

243

professional judgment standard, recognizing that like the mental health
patients in Youngberg, foster children are entitled to more considerate
treatment than prison inmates. 162 As opposed to the Seventh Circuit, the
Tenth Circuit did not require that the plaintiff prove the defendant
subjectively knew that the harm was occurring. 163 So, if a caseworker
has exercised no professional judgment in placing the child, whether he
knew the child was being maltreated or not, the caseworker might be
found liable for the resulting harm. 164
Noting that the holding of the Tenth Circuit case created confusion
about how the professional judgment standard should be applied, 165 the
District Court of Wyoming looked to the analysis of the standard
presented by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 166 The court stressed
that to require actual knowledge of abuse “would encourage an ‘ostrich’
approach to placement of foster children, where a victimized foster child
could be left at the mercy of abusers, just as long as the state agent never
‘knew or suspected’ that the child was being abused.” 167 Furthermore,
the court recounted the concurring opinion of Chief Judge Seitz in the
Third Circuit’s holding in Youngberg, 168 which had been cited and
adopted in the Supreme Court’s opinion in the same case. 169 In Judge
Seitz’s concurrence, he asserted that state agents “have an affirmative
obligation to discover the needs of . . . patients, and to respond to those
needs in an adequate manner.” 170 The District Court of Wyoming
concluded that the Supreme Court intended for the professional judgment
standard to require only that the government actor exercised professional
judgment, and that liability may not be avoided by showing a lack of
knowledge of harm. 171
If all courts would take the approach of the District Court of
Wyoming, which included a thoughtful assessment of the interests and
circumstances of foster children and a close look at the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Youngberg, they would realize that the professional judgment
standard is the appropriate standard to apply in foster care maltreatment

162

Id.
Id. (holding that the professional judgment standard “does not require actual knowledge
the children will be harmed”).
164
Id. at 893-94.
165
T.M. ex rel. R.T. v. Carson, 93 F.Supp.2d 1179, 1188 (D.Wyo. 2000).
166
Id. at 1190.
167
Id. (citing Wendy H. v. City of Philadelphia, 849 F.Supp. 367, 371-72 (E.D.Pa. 1994)).
168
Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 173 (3d Cir. 1980) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J. concurring).
169
T.M. ex rel. R.T., 93 F.Supp.2d at 1192.
170
Id. (quoting Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 177 (3d Cir. 1980)).
171
Id. (citing Wendy H. v. City of Philadelphia, 849 F.Supp. 367, 373 (E.D.Pa. 1994)).
163
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cases. While some courts have considered child welfare agents’
conformance with their professional and statutory duties, and other
courts have compared the circumstances of foster children to the
circumstances of prisoners and mental health patients, a serious
assessment of foster children’s interests has typically been lacking.
Foster children’s constitutionally protected right to safety while in state
care is too important to allow this issue to remain unresolved. 172
IV. CONSIDERING THE RELEVANT INTERESTS & CIRCUMSTANCES, THE
STATE HAS A HEIGHTENED DUTY TO PROTECT FOSTER CHILDREN,
SO THE PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENT STANDARD SHOULD BE
ADOPTED
To resolve this circuit split, the Supreme Court must delineate the
duty to protect foster children by assessing what state conduct would be
sufficiently conscience shocking to warrant liability. As the Court has
made clear, what shocks the conscience in one setting may not be so
shocking in another. 173 To determine the appropriate liability standard,
the court must analyze the exact circumstances 174 and balance the liberty
interests of the individual against the relevant interests of the state. 175
Therefore, in the foster care context, the court should assess the
peculiar circumstances of foster children and balance their interests with
the interests of the government. First and foremost, children have a
significant interest in being protected from maltreatment. 176 Indeed, it is
central to their Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from
unreasonable risks of harm. Correspondingly, the state has an important
interest in protecting children from maltreatment. 177 The government
also has a general interest in the protection of its citizens. 178 Beyond
these interests, the peculiar circumstances of foster children place them
in a much more vulnerable position than mental health patients and
prisoners, and, therefore, the state should be held to a higher standard of
172

See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 347-48 (1816) (asserting “the importance, and
even necessity of uniformity of decisions throughout the whole United States, upon all subjects
within the purview of the constitution.”); See generally Wayne A. Logan, Constitutional
Cacophony: Federal Circuit Splits and the Fourth Amendment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1137, 1160-85
(2012) (discussing arguments for and against resolution of circuit splits regarding federal
constitutional rights).
173
Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 851 (1998).
174
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. at 850.
175
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
176
Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
177
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 865 (1997).
178
Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 340 (1993).
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care in regards to foster children. Weighing all of these interests and
circumstances, it becomes clear that the state has a heightened duty to
protect foster children from harm, and the professional judgment
standard is the appropriate standard to apply in foster care maltreatment
cases.
A.

INTERESTS IN PROTECTING CHILDREN AGAINST MALTREATMENT

The Supreme Court has long recognized the critically important
interest in protecting the welfare of our nation’s children. 179 “It is the
interest of youth itself, and of the whole community, that children be
both safeguarded from abuses and given opportunities for growth into
free and independent well-developed men and citizens.” 180 Due to “the
peculiar vulnerability of children; their inability to make critical
decisions in an informed, mature manner; and the importance of the
parental role in child rearing,” the constitutional rights of children are
different than those of adults. 181 In fact, Justice Brennan has suggested
that children may even be entitled to greater constitutional protection
than adults. 182 Upon consideration of the interests of children to be
protected from maltreatment, it is clear that Justice Brennan was right.
The interests of children in being protected from abuse and being
given the opportunities for healthy growth into adulthood 183 are of
utmost importance. When these interests are not protected, the
ramifications can be devastating. Child maltreatment is so injurious that
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention has deemed it a public
health problem. 184 Immediate physical injuries range from bruises to
broken bones to hemorrhage. 185 Long-term effects of maltreatment may
include physical ailments such as shaken baby syndrome, impaired brain
179

See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 865 (noting “the State’s independent interest in the
well-being of its youth”); Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990) (discussing “the State’s
traditional and ‘transcendent interest in protecting the welfare of children”‘) (citing Ginsberg v.
N.Y., 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968)); Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981) (noting
“the State has an urgent interest in the welfare of the child”).
180
Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
181
Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979).
182
See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 627 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
183
Prince, 321 U.S. at 165.
184
REBECCA T. LEEB ET AL., CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NAT’L CTR. FOR
INJURY PREVENTION & CONTROL, CHILD MALTREATMENT SURVEILLANCE 3 (2008), available at
www.cdc.gov/ViolencePrevention/pdf/CM_Surveillance-a.pdf.
185
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT
3
(2013),
available
at
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/factsheets/long_term_consequences.pdf.
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development, and poor physical health. 186 Moreover, the stress that
children experience as a result of maltreatment can disrupt early brain
development. 187 It may also interfere with the development of the
nervous system and regulation of the immune system. 188
Children who have been maltreated are also more likely to develop
emotional, behavioral, and psychological problems. 189 Psychological
effects immediately apparent in maltreated children include feelings of
isolation, fear, and loss of the ability to trust others. 190 Long-term
consequences may include low self-esteem, difficulty with relationships,
depression, anxiety, and a variety of other psychological conditions. 191
When children experience severe and prolonged maltreatment, they are
more likely to have health problems as adults, including alcoholism,
depression, drug abuse, eating disorders, smoking, suicide, and certain
chronic diseases. 192 Furthermore, when a child is removed from his or
her home because of severe maltreatment, the child may suffer additional
emotional trauma from the removal itself. 193
Beyond the individual interests of children in being protected
against these devastating effects, the state has a great interest in
preventing abuse and neglect. Child maltreatment poses a significant
economic and social burden to society. Each year, the expenses flowing

186

Id. at 3-4.
NAT’L SCIENTIFIC COUNCIL ON THE DEVELOPING CHILD, EXCESSIVE STRESS DISRUPTS
THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE DEVELOPING BRAIN, WORKING PAPER #3, at 2 (2005), available at
http://developingchild.harvard.edu/index.php/resources/reports_and_working_papers/working_paper
s/wp3; CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 4 (noting that child maltreatment may also result in poor academic performance, language
development, and cognitive capacity).
188
Tiffany Watts-English et al., The Psychobiology of Maltreatment in Childhood, 62 J. SOC.
ISSUES 717, 719 (2006), available at www.ocfcpacourts.us/assets/files/list-758/file-937.pdf.
189
See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, LONG-TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 4-6.
190
Id. at 4.
191
Id.
192
D. Runyan et al., World Health Org., Child Abuse & Neglect by Parents & Other
Caregivers, in WORLD REPORT ON VIOLENCE AND HEALTH 59, 69 (E. Krug et al. eds., 2002),
available at www.who.int/violence_injury_prevention/violence/global_campaign/en/chap3.pdf.
193
CECILIA CASANUEVA ET AL., OFFICE OF PLANNING, RESEARCH & EVALUATION, ADMIN.
FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL SURVEY OF
CHILD AND ADOLESCENT WELL-BEING, NO. 18: INSTABILITY AND EARLY LIFE CHANGES AMONG
CHILDREN
IN
THE
CHILD
WELFARE
SYSTEM
1
(2012),
available
at
www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/opre/early_life.pdf. Besides the initial trauma of removal,
attachment is disrupted. When children do not develop healthy attachments with at least one
caregiver, they are at great risk for cognitive delays, relationship dysfunction, and emotional
development. CALL TO ACTION ON BEHALF OF MALTREATED INFANTS AND TODDLERS 4 (2011),
available at www.zerotothree.org/public-policy/federal-policy/childwelfareweb.pdf.
187
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from new cases of abuse and neglect total approximately $124 billion. 194
Every victim of fatal child abuse costs society almost $1.3 million, and
every victim of nonfatal maltreatment costs over $210 thousand.195
These estimates incorporate the increased medical costs, 196 criminal
justice costs, 197 child welfare costs, 198 educational costs, 199 and
productivity losses 200 that result from child abuse and neglect. 201
Considering the individual and state interests in preventing child
maltreatment, it is even more important for the state to ensure that
children are protected from harm than it is to ensure the protection of
adults. Children are in their formative years, and the majority of
physical, emotional, social, and intellectual development occurs during
childhood. 202 As a result, the potential impact of harm is greater for
them than for adults. Maltreatment during childhood may have lifelong
consequences, but early intervention may provide children with the tools
to rebound from abuse and neglect. 203 Placing maltreated children into
nurturing foster homes, where they can obtain proper care and treatment,
protects their interests in safety and personal security. 204 To maintain
that safety, it is critical that foster care agents do more than simply
respond to known harms, which is essentially all the deliberate
indifference standard requires. In contrast, by requiring that state agents
comply with professional standards and make informed decisions, the
professional judgment standard would require that caseworkers take a
more active role in protecting foster children.

194

Xiangming Fang, et al., The Economic Burden of Child Maltreatment in the United States
and Implications for Prevention, 36 CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 156, 163 (2012).
195
Id.
196
The average lifetime healthcare cost per victim of nonfatal maltreatment is $43,178. Id. at
160.
197
The average lifetime criminal justice cost per victim of nonfatal maltreatment is $6,747.
Id.
198
The average lifetime child welfare cost per victim of nonfatal maltreatment is $7,728. Id.
199
The average lifetime special education cost per victim of nonfatal maltreatment is $7,999.
Id.
200
The average lifetime productivity loss per victim of nonfatal maltreatment is $144,360. Id.
201
Id.
202
See generally, GREATER TWIN CITIES UNITED WAY, RESEARCH & PLANNING, EARLY
CHILDHOOD DEVELOPMENT: BUILDING BLOCKS FOR LIFE (July 2010), available at
www.unitedwaytwincities.org/_asset/stt995/eli_BriefingPaperFinal.pdf.
203
See CALL TO ACTION ON BEHALF OF MALTREATED INFANTS AND TODDLERS 17.
204
See Melinda Smith & Jeanne Segal, Child Abuse and Neglect: Recognizing, Preventing,
(Aug.
2013),
available
at
and
Reporting
Child
Abuse,
HELPGUIDE.ORG
www.helpguide.org/mental/child_abuse_physical_emotional_sexual_neglect.htm.
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STATE’S INTERESTS IN THE SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP CONTEXT

In assessing the duty to protect foster children, some courts have
furthered their analyses by comparing the state interests served by taking
foster children into state care with the interests served by taking mental
health patients and prisoners into state custody. 205 Those government
interests include general protection 206 and punishment. 207 To further
these interests, the state may take individuals involuntarily into its
custody under its parens patriae 208 power and under its police power. 209
Pursuant to its parens patriae powers, the government has the authority to
protect individuals incapable of acting in their own best interests. 210 Its
police powers grant the state the authority to protect individuals from
harm and to promote the public welfare. 211
So, the government essentially has dual interests in protection. On
one hand is its interest in safeguarding individuals who are unable to care
for themselves. 212 On the other hand is its interest in defending society
at large from those it deems a threat to the general welfare. 213 Removing
children from the custody of parents unable to care for them, and placing
the children in safe foster homes, serves the important interest in
protecting them as individuals. 214 Likewise, persons suffering from
mental illness may be taken into state care for their protection when they
are deemed unable to care for themselves. 215 Unlike foster children,
though, the government also uses its police powers to involuntarily
commit someone with mentally illness when the person is deemed a risk
to the safety of others. 216 In the case of an institutionalized mental health
patient, the state is interested in the protection of both the individual and

205

See, e.g.,, K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 857 (7th Cir. 1990); T.M. ex rel.
R.T. v. Carson, 93 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1190-91 (D. Wyo. 2000); Kara B. v. Dane Cnty., 555 N.W.2d
630, 634 (Wisc. 1996).
206
See Heller v. Doe ex rel. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 340 (1993) (noting the state’s “legitimate
interests in protection, care, and treatment”).
207
See Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011) (noting that the state has an “interest in
punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation”).
208
Latin for “parent of his or her country.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1144 (9th ed. 2009).
209
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975).
210
Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State’s Burden Under
Federal Child Protection Legislation, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259, 264 (2003).
211
Id.
212
Id.
213
Id.
214
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982).
215
Addington v. Tex., 441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979).
216
Id.
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society, because the person has been judged so mentally ill that he poses
a threat to himself and others. 217 Criminals, in contrast, are taken into
state custody under the police power theory largely for the protection of
society. 218 Unlike foster children and mental health patients, criminals
are not detained by the government for the purpose of protecting them as
individuals.
In addition to protection, the government may take a person into
state custody for the purpose of punishment. The primary state interests
served by taking criminals into its custody include the protection of
society 219 and the punishment of the individual. 220 The government has a
duty to protect prisoners only to the extent that maltreatment may not be
so bad that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. 221 As a result,
the conditions of prisons may be harsh, but liability may only attach
when harm serves no “legitimate penological objectiv[e].” 222 In
comparison, the Supreme Court has noted that those who have been
involuntarily committed are entitled to more considerate conditions than
prisoners, because the conditions of confinement for prisoners are
“designed to punish,” 223 and mental health patients “may not be punished
at all.” 224 The government interests served by involuntarily commitment
include protecting the individual and protecting society from the
mentally ill individual. Like mental health patients, foster children are
not taken into state care for the purpose of punishment. 225 In stark
contrast, the singular societal interest in foster care is the protection of
the child.
Comparing the state’s interests in the protection and punishment of
prisoners, mental health patients, and foster children, it is clear that foster
children are most similar to mental health patients. Not only is the
state’s duty to protect foster children at least as great as it’s duty to
protect mental health patients, considering the particular circumstances
of foster children, the government should be subject to a heightened duty
to protect the children in foster care.

217

Id.
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975).
219
See id.
220
See Brown v. Plata, 131 S.Ct. 1910, 1928 (2011).
221
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).
222
Id. at 833 (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 548 (1984)).
223
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22 (1982).
224
Id. at 315-16.
225
Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 859 (Wash. 2003) (en banc).
218
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C.

DUE TO THE PECULIAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF FOSTER CHILDREN,
THE STATE HAS A HEIGHTENED DUTY TO PROTECT THEM FROM
HARM

1.

The State Steps into the Shoes of the Foster Child’s Parents

In furtherance of the individual and state interests in child
protection, the government may remove a child from the care of his or
her natural parents, assuming the temporary role of parent. 226 With that
role comes the expectation that the state will fulfill the duties reasonably
expected of a parent. 227 The Supreme Court has recognized that a parent
has an interest in “and obligation for the welfare and health of the
child.” 228 In the foster care system, the state has taken on the temporary
legal role of parent, and the foster parents effectively serve as caretakers.
As “parent,” though, it is the state’s responsibility to ensure that the
caretaker is not doing anything to harm the child. Because the
government actively takes on the role of parent, it assumes a heightened
duty to protect foster children.
The importance of the parental role is magnified by the child’s
“peculiar vulnerability” and “inability to make critical decisions in an
informed, mature manner.” 229 By assuming the temporary role of parent
for foster children, the state acknowledges that the children are not
capable of taking care of themselves. Unlike most adults, who can take
care of their own basic and medical needs, contact law enforcement if
they are being maltreated, and logically assess their options, children
generally need the guidance and assistance of adults. 230 While older
children can certainly protect themselves to a greater extent than infants

226

K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 855 (7th Cir. 1990) (Coffey, J., dissenting)
(quoting Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Yvonne L. ex rel. Lewis v.
N.M. Dep’t of Human Servs., 959 F.2d 883, 894 (10th Cir. 1992).
227
K.H. ex rel. Murphy, 914 F.2d at 855 (Coffey, J., dissenting) (quoting Nelson v. Heyne,
491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir. 1974); see also Yvonne L., 959 F.2d at 894.
228
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979) (emphasis added).
229
Bellotti v. Baird 443 U.S. 622, 634 (1979). At the international level, the United Nations
has also declared “the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special
safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection.” Declaration of the Rights of the Child,
G.A. Res. 1386 (XIV), 19 U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959), available at
www.unicef.org/lac/spbarbados/Legal/global/General/declaration_child1959.pdf.
230
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT &
COMPETENCY 4-6 (2010), available at www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jjguidebook-adolescent.pdf.
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and toddlers, their competence to fully understand their rights and
remedies may not be as developed as adults. 231
In contrast, adult prisoners are not only capable of protecting their
own interests; they are largely required to do so. They do not need and
are not entitled to “parental” protection. The understanding that
prisoners must take an active role in protecting their own interests is
reflected in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PRLA). 232 Pursuant to the
PRLA, a prisoner may not bring an action under § 1983 until he or she
has exhausted all available administrative remedies. 233 Furthermore,
prisoners are primarily responsible for their own wellbeing and for
maintaining the conditions of their personal space. 234 Since adult
inmates are generally capable of fending for themselves, it would not be
shocking to require them to notify prison officials if they were at risk of
harm. Thus, it is not unreasonable to require, as the deliberate
indifference standard does, that a prison official have actual knowledge
of harm before liability may be imposed.
Unlike prison inmates, those who have been involuntarily
committed to a mental institution are generally not able to make
decisions for themselves and to protect their own interests, 235 but they
are also not provided with “parental” care by the state. While
involuntary commitment is effected in part through the government’s
parens patriae power, the state does not actually step into the role of
parent for mental health patients. Children who have been committed are
still primarily the responsibility of their parents, as commitment does not
normally involve the termination of parental rights. 236 Adults may have

231

Id.
See Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions & Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104134, 110 Stat. 1321 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C. (1996)).
233
42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) (Westlaw 2014).
234
See, e.g.,, FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, INMATE INFORMATION HANDBOOK, FCI/SCP
GILMER (2012), available at www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/gil/GIL_aohandbook.pdf (inmate
responsibilities include: maintaining the cleanliness of the inmate’s living area, arriving at work on
time, knowing the amount of money in his commissary account, keeping “call-out” appointments,
and generally understanding and complying with all institution policies).
235
JOHN A. MENNINGER, INVOLUNTARY TREATMENT: HOSPITALIZATION AND MEDICATIONS
1,
available
at
www.brown.edu/Courses/BI_278/Other/Clerkship/Didactics/Readings/INVOLUNTARY%20TREA
TMENT.pdf (last visited Apr. 18, 2014).
236
Cf. 39 C.J.S. Guardian & Ward § 9 (2013) (“[A] guardian should not be appointed where
at least one parent is living and is not found to be unfit or incapacitated or to have relinquished or
forfeited his or her rights.”). But see MARY GILIBERTI & RHODA SCHULZINGER, BAZELON CENTER
FOR MENTAL HEALTH LAW, RELINQUISHING CUSTODY: THE TRAGIC RESULT OF FAILURE TO MEET
CHILDREN’S MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1 (2000), available at
www.bazelon.org/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=-hWbIbUX5v8%3d&tabid=104 (explaining that, due to
232
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guardians appointed, 237 but they are not provided parental care from the
state. Also unlike foster children, mental health patients often find
support in family members concerned with their wellbeing. 238 Even
though the state does not have a heightened duty to protect involuntarily
committed mental health patients, the patients are still entitled to more
considerate care than prisoners.
To an even greater extent than mental health patients, children are in
need of guidance and protection. It is imperative that the state take an
active role in their protection, beyond just responding to obvious risks.
As one court so eloquently stated, “[s]omething more than refraining
from indifferent action is required to protect these innocents.” 239 The
professional judgment standard is more appropriate for the state’s
heightened “parental” duty to protect foster children, because it requires
that caseworkers actively avail themselves of the information necessary
to make learned professional decisions about those in their care.
2.

Foster Children Rely on Caseworkers to Guard Their Safety

Children who have been removed from their parents’ care have a
critical need for someone to advocate for their best interests. 240 As one
court has explained, “the law does not impose the duty of guarding their
own safety on wards of the state. Rather, that duty is the quintessential
responsibility of the caseworkers assigned to safeguard the well-being of
this helpless and vulnerable population.” 241
Foster children need caseworkers to ensure that they remain safe
while in state care, due in large part to the tendency for children to
remain silent regarding maltreatment. One reason for this is that they
often see the abuse as “normal” and fear another relocation. 242 In 2012,
the alleged victims submitted only 0.4% of the reports of child

exorbitant costs, many families are effectively forced to choose between obtaining mental health
treatment for their children and retaining legal custody).
237
J. Howard Ziemann, Incompetency and Commitment Proceedings, 8 AM. JUR. Trials 483 §
2 (2014).
238
Neil H. Mickenberg, The Silent Clients: Legal and Ethical Considerations in Representing
Severely and Profoundly Retarded Individuals, 31 STAN. L. REV. 625, 628 (1979).
239
Braam ex rel. Braam v. State, 81 P.3d 851, 859 (Wash. 2003) (en banc).
240
Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 631 (1979) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
241
Tamas v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 630 F.3d 833, 843 (9th Cir. 2010).
242
Susanne Babbel, The Foster Care System and Its Victims: Part 2, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY
(Jan. 3, 2012), www.psychologytoday.com/blog/somatic-psychology/201201/the-foster-care-systemand-its-victims-part-2.
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maltreatment. 243 There are many reasons that children who have been
abused choose not to report the abuse, including shame, fear of
punishment, prior victimization, and self blame. 244 Also, the perpetrator
may threaten to harm the child if he or she reports the abuse. 245 When
questioned, these reasons may also result in the child denying the
abuse. 246 When children have been abused by their parents, they often
develop difficulty trusting others, 247 and therefore may be less likely to
confide in caseworkers regarding abuse in foster homes. The existence
of mandatory reporting laws throughout the county 248 is clear evidence
that legislatures and child welfare agencies recognize that children often
do not speak up for themselves.
Due to the particularly vulnerable circumstances of foster children
and the reality that many do not report the maltreatment they experience,
it is essential that caseworkers play an active role in protecting them.
Statutory mandates and industry standards for monitoring child
placement have been designed to provide the affirmative protections
needed to safeguard foster children. 249
Several courts have held that when a professional failed to act in
accord with state laws or agency rules, he or she may be found to have

243

U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD MALTREATMENT
2012, at 12 (2013), available at www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2012.pdf.
244
Reasons Why Children do not Tell, THE NEST CHILD ADVOCACY CTR.,
www.nestcac.org/WhyDontKidsTell.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2014) (also citing fear no one will
believe them, fear of loss, loyalty to the offender, instruction to secrecy, belief the child is protecting
siblings from abuse, desire to prevent breakup of family unit); Reasons Why Children do not Tell,
CHILD SAFE OF CENT. MO., www.childsafehouse.org/get-informed/reasons-not-tell.cfm (last visited
Jan. 19, 2014); see also Melinda Smith & Jeanne Segal, Child Abuse and Neglect: Recognizing,
(Aug.
2013),
Preventing,
and
Reporting
Child
Abuse,
HELPGUIDE.ORG
www.helpguide.org/mental/child_abuse_physical_emotional_sexual_neglect.htm.
245
See DERRY KORALEK, CAREGIVERS OF YOUNG CHILDREN: PREVENTING AND RESPONDING
TO
CHILD
MALTREATMENT
17
(1992),
available
at
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/caregive/caregive.pdf.
246
Reasons Why Children do not Tell, THE NEST CHILD ADVOCACY CTR. (also citing fear no
one will believe them, fear of loss, loyalty to the offender, instruction to secrecy, belief the child is
protecting siblings from abuse, desire to prevent breakup of family unit); Reasons Why Children do
not Tell, CHILD SAFE OF CENT. MO.
247
Smith & Segal, Child Abuse and Neglect: Recognizing, Preventing, and Reporting Child
Abuse.
248
See CHILD WELFARE INFO. MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 2
(2012),
available
at
www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/manda.pdf
(describing mandatory reporting laws across the U.S. and its territories).
249
See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MAJOR FEDERAL LEGISLATION
CONCERNED WITH CHILD PROTECTION, CHILD WELFARE, AND ADOPTION (2012), available at
www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/otherpubs/majorfedlegis.pdf.
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substantially departed from “professional judgment.” 250 A pattern of
failures to ensure foster home licensing standards are met, to perform
child-specific home studies, and to perform minimum monthly home
visits 251 should subject child welfare agents to liability if a foster child is
harmed as a result. Caseworker visits, in particular, are “critical” to
ensuring the safety of children in the foster care system. 252 As one court
noted, foster children are “isolated . . . [and] helpless,” and without
proper supervision of the foster home, the child is “at the mercy of the
foster parents.” 253 If these duties are not performed, the fact that a
caseworker is unaware of signs of maltreatment, and therefore does not
conclude that a child is being harmed, should not preclude the child from
obtaining a remedy. In that instance, the government has failed to
perform its heightened “parental” duty to protect foster children and
should be held liable for the resulting harm.
3.

Supervision by Foster Parents is Minimal

In defining the limits of the state’s duty to protect, several courts
have also considered the degree of supervision that government agents
have over the persons in their care. 254 For example, the Ninth Circuit
justified its contrary use of the professional judgment standard for mental
health patients and the deliberate indifference standard for foster children
by asserting that the application of different standards is “logical”
because “the degree of control and day-to-day responsibility that the
government exerts over [mental health patients] is considerably
higher.” 255 Another court noted that there is a “closer relationship”
between prison officers and inmates than there is between child welfare
agents and foster children. 256 In prisons, state agents have daily contact
with inmates, so they are better able to monitor potentially harmful

250

See, e.g.,, Thomas S. v. Flaherty, 902 F.2d 250, 252 (4th Cir. 1990); Gary H. v. Hegstrom,
831 F.2d 1430, 1439 (9th Cir. 1987) (Ferguson, J., concurring).
251
The federal government has concluded that one major reason so many states do not
comply with child welfare law requirements is that state child welfare agencies are understaffed.
Maria Scannapieco & Kelli Connell-Carrick, Child Welfare Workplace: The State of the Workplace
and Strategies to Improve Retention, CHILD WELFARE 31, 32 (2007).
252
NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKER VISITS
WITH
CHILDREN
AND
PARENTS
3
(2006),
available
at
www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/cyf/caseworkervisits.pdf.
253
Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 797 (11th Cir. 1987).
254
See Ammons v. Wash. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 648 F.3d 1020, 1029 n.8 (9th Cir.
2011); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 852 (7th Cir. 1990); Taylor, 818 F.2d at 796.
255
Ammons, 648 F.3d at 1029 n.8.
256
Taylor, 818 F.2d at 796.
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activity and its effect upon inmates. 257 Another court has noted that it is
more difficult to protect children from maltreatment in private foster
homes than it is to protect them in institutions. 258 Whereas state actors
have daily contact with prisoners and mental health patients, foster
children are visited approximately once a month. 259
Underlying the claim that frequency of contact is relevant to the
liability standard is the reality that it is more difficult for the government
to monitor foster homes than it is to monitor institutions. However, the
paramount interest in child protection—an interest shared by the state
and the children in its care—should take precedence over a governmental
claim of inconvenience. It is, in fact, the state that creates this difficult
situation when it elects to remove the child from his or her home and
place the child with strangers, rather than with government agents. This
election may be a better choice for foster children than institutional
care, 260 but it should not lessen the duty of the government to protect the
child. As one court has noted, “[i]t should have been obvious from the
day Youngberg was decided that a state could not avoid the
responsibilities which that decision had placed on it merely by delegating
custodial responsibility to irresponsible private persons.” 261 When the
state has chosen to remove a child from the custody of his parents, and
then places the child in a home that the state only monitors
intermittently, it should at a very minimum follow basic standards to
ensure the home is safe.
Given the heightened duty to protect foster children, the state’s
minimal contact with foster parents should serve as a reason for higher
expectations of foster care agents, not lower. In contrast to foster homes,
the daily monitoring in prison and mental institutions provides more
opportunities for the government to gain knowledge of maltreatment.
Professional and statutory standards for foster home visits,
investigations, and licensures have been designed in recognition of the
state’s reduced control of foster homes. Since caseworkers have fewer
257

Id.
K.H. ex rel. Murphy, 914 F.2d at 852.
259
See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, CHILD WELFARE CASEWORKER VISITS
WITH
CHILDREN
AND
PARENTS
3
(2006),
available
at
www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/documents/cyf/caseworkervisits.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., CHILDREN’S BUREAU, CHILD WELFARE OUTCOMES 2008-2011: REPORT TO CONGRESS 19
(2013), available at www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cwo08_11.pdf (reporting that
approximately 82% of foster children received monthly visits in 2011, of the states reported).
260
See Brenda Jones Harden, Safety and Stability for Foster Children: A Developmental
Perspective, 14 CHILD, FAMILIES, & FOSTER CARE 31, 38 (2004), available at
www.princeton.edu/futureofchildren/publications/docs/14_01_02.pdf.
261
K.H. ex rel. Murphy, 914 F.2d at 851.
258
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opportunities to interact with foster families, it is crucial that they
comply with these standards. If they fail to do so, they should be held
liable under the professional judgment standard.
CONCLUSION
It would be plainly shocking for the state to shirk its duty because it
is not itself the daily caretaker of foster children. Application of the
deliberate indifference standard allows government agents to avoid
liability in this way. In contrast, the professional judgment standard
recognizes the need for proactive measures on the part of state agents.
Under the professional judgment standard, the government would only
be liable if its agents exhibited an egregious pattern of failures to fulfill
their professional mandates—simple negligence would not result in
liability. When caseworkers have been so derelict in their duties that
they do not know children in their care are at substantial risk for harm,
when proper monitoring would have provided such knowledge, they
cannot be reasonably said to have exercised professional judgment.
When their actions or failures to act are based on a professionally
inadequate knowledge base, those actions or omissions should be
considered so arbitrary as to be conscience shocking.
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